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bookmark_border27. Mai 2009: Berlin,
Anhörung "Kinderpornographiesperre"

Veröffentlicht am von wvs

Nach­dem die Stel­lung­nah­men der bis­her benann­ten Betei­lig­ten im Inter­net ver­füg­bar sind habe ich mich dar­an gemacht sie sämt­lich zu lesen - 'zu lesen' bedeu­tet: Von Anfang bis Ende, ein­schließ­lich etwa­iger Ver­wei­se (Links) auf frü­he­re Stellungnahmen ....

Das hat zwar Zeit geko­stet, war aber sehr auf­schluß­reich. Die Fach­ver­bän­de und Fach­gut­ach­ter (Inter­net & Recht) stel­len im wesent­li­chen das als ände­rungs­be­dürf­tig und 'mit der hei­ßen Nadel gestickt' dar, was von den 'Akti­vi­sten' ange­pran­gert wird. Ich schen­ke mir eine Wie­der­ho­lung, die Argu­men­te sind bekannt. Hier eine kur­ze Charakterisierung:

BITKOM [Ableh­nung - mit Vor­schlä­gen zur Ver­bes­se­rung in tech­ni­scher und recht­li­cher Sicht.]
DIHK [Kur­ze, prä­zi­se und sach­kun­di­ge Dar­stel­lung der Män­gel des Gesetz­ent­wur­fes aus Sicht der Durch­führ­bar­keit und Struktur.]
ECO [weist - mit außer­or­dent­li­chem Befrem­den (!) - auf Dis­kre­pan­zen zwi­schen den bei den frü­he­ren Ver­hand­lun­gen fest­ge­leg­ten Rege­lun­gen und dann dazu völ­lig unter­schied­lich fest­ge­schrie­be­nen Maß­nah­men und Vor­ga­ben des vor­lie­gen­den Tex­tes hin.]
Dr. Korin­na Kuh­nen [Infor­mier­te, aber super vor­sich­tig aus­ge­drück­te Infra­ge­stel­lung von Tei­len des Geset­zes­vor­ha­bens; ich glau­be zwi­schen den Zei­len eine Ableh­nung zu erken­nen, die aber wohl aus Vor­sicht (mit dem Gedan­ken an die wei­te­re Kar­rie­re?) nicht expli­zit zum Aus­druck kommt]
Dr. Die­ter Frey [Klar abschmet­tern­de recht­li­che Sicht, ver­klau­su­liert wer­den schlam­pi­ge For­mu­lie­run­gen und Unwis­sen­heit in eini­gen Rechts­ge­bie­ten erwähnt.]

Wie zu erwar­ten war gibt es sei­tens des BKA ein ver­wa­sche­nes, mit Flos­keln ohne jeden Sach­be­zug gespick­tes Geschwur­bel. Die bekann­ten Argu­men­te von WS / UvdL wer­den wie­der­ge­käut, Das BKA hat eigent­lich nur eine Aussage:
Wir wol­len alle Rech­te aber kei­ner­lei Kon­trol­le - egal von wem.

Absatz­wei­se - unfrei­wil­lig - erhei­tern­den Cha­rak­ter hat die Stel­lung­nah­me des BDK "Bund(es) Deut­scher Kri­mi­nal­be­am­ter", deren Tenor ich etwa so beschrei­be: "Wir sind wil­lig & über­la­stet, gebt uns mehr Zeit und schult unse­re Mit­glie­der ent­spre­chend, dann lie­fern wir auch bes­se­re Ergebnisse".

Prof. Dr. Micha­el Oster­hei­der, Uni­ver­si­tät Regens­burg [Rei­nes "Gefäl­lig­keits­gut­ach­ten" mit selbst­be­weih­räu­chern­dem Cha­rak­ter und wenig Substanz.]

Gemein­sa­me Stel­lung­nah­me von UNICEF, Deut­sches Kin­der­hilfs­werk, Inno­cence in Dan­ger, ECPAT, Save the Child­ren und Deut­scher Kin­der­schutz­bund [Herz­er­wei­chen­des Plä­doy­er - lei­der wer­den ledig­lich All­ge­mein­plät­ze wie­der­holt und es wird an Gefüh­le appel­liert - kein Bei­trag 'zur Sache', bar jeden tech­ni­schen Ver­ständ­nis­ses, Aktio­nis­mus um jeden Preis.]

Wenn es also wirk­lich um die Kin­der­por­no­gra­phie geht muß sich aus Sicht der über­wie­gen­den Zahl der Stel­lung­nah­men noch viel, sehr viel ändern .... 

Ich bin gespannt, was wir am Ende sehen:
Ein­sicht oder Beharren. 

Für den letz­te­ren Fall steht dann auch fest was eini­ge der Stel­lung­neh­men­den andeu­ten - es geht nicht um Kin­der und deren Schutz son­dern um ZENSUR - und für die­sen Fall wird auch mit­ge­teilt, daß man 'höchst­rich­ter­li­che Klä­rung' als Fol­ge sieht ....


*edit*
Bei Hei­se fin­det sich zu die­sem The­ma heu­te eine (ähn­li­che) Zusam­men­fas­sung ....

 

bookmark_borderWenn ich sterbe ....

Veröffentlicht am von wvs

ver­ma­che ich NICHTS an mei­ne Hin­ter­blie­be­nen - ich habe näm­lich eine bes­se­re Mög­lich­keit gefunden ...!
(Ein lang­ge­heg­ter Wunsch der Mensch­heit wird wahr: Zwar hat "das letz­te Hemd" immer noch "kei­ne Taschen" - aber dafür gibt es jetzt eine Lösung ....

Die Sache mit dem Passwort/Zugang muß ich aller­dings noch klä­ren - wer­de ich mich dar­an erinnern?

[via]

bookmark_borderErinnern! Alternativ wählen!

Veröffentlicht am von wvs


" .. Unmut muß sich auch in Wahl­er­geb­nis­sen niederschlagen!!

Der nun mitt­ler­wei­le hef­tig umstrit­te­ne Gesetz­ent­wurf ist nicht allein der Gesetz­ent­wurf von Ursu­la von der Ley­en, es ist der Gesetz­ent­wurf, der von einer schwarz-roten Bun­des­re­gie­rung beschlos­sen wur­de. Von rot und schwarz!

Wie dop­pel­zün­gig mal wie­der die SPD ist, zeigt sich dar­in, daß sie sich nun für eine öffent­li­che Anhö­rung im Unter­aus­schuss (27.5) aus­ge­spro­chen hat. Toll, toll – Jubel!!! Aber das ist die sel­be SPD, die noch vor weni­gen Tagen dem Gesetz­ent­wurf mal eben zuge­stimmt hat!

Poli­tik soll­te für uns und nicht gegen uns gemacht wer­den. Idea­ler­wei­se mit uns, und genau des­halb gehe ich zur Euro­pa­wahl und mach mein Kreuz sicher nicht bei den Wahl­ver­spre­chern (von CDU & SPD, auch nicht bei­den Hel­fers­hel­fern von FDP & Grünen) .. "

[Zitat/Bild "Stopp­schild"] | [Bild "Merkel"/Quelle]


"Pro­jekt >18" für die SPD
  "Pro­jekt >29" für die CDU 

bookmark_border"Vor"-Zensur, "vorauseilender Gehorsam", oder was?

Veröffentlicht am von wvs

Ich hät­te nicht geglaubt daß es sowas tat­säch­lich gibt.
Min­de­stens teil­wei­se bin ich aber auch betrof­fen - mit einem stink­nor­ma­len Weblog!

 

Ganz beson­ders schlimm fin­de ich aber, daß hier dem Denun­zi­an­ten­tum Vor­schub gelei­stet wird: Um eine Web­adres­se 'anzu­schwär­zen' braucht man sich nicht ein­mal zu identifizieren ....


Ich bin ent­setzt wenn ich mir vor­stel­le, wel­ches 'Gedan­ken­gut' in einer sol­chen Zen­sur­or­ga­ni­sa­ti­on vor­herr­schen muß. Das ist ein unge­heu­er­li­cher Vor­gang - daß das unver­öf­fent­licht, völ­lig unbe­merkt und ohne jede gesetz­li­che Kon­trol­le pas­sie­ren kann .... Wer­den nun alle Sei­ten gesperrt die über sol­che Machen­schaf­ten berich­ten? Wie setzt man sich gegen der­lei "opt-in" (nach Sper­re!) zur Wehr?

*edit*
Ich schla­ge allen Lesern vor sich auf die "check"-Seite zu bege­ben und - wenn eine Sper­re vor­han­den ist - nach­zu­fra­gen - eini­ge der mög­li­chen Fra­gen sind ja im Bei­trag auf­ge­li­stet .... Da wird der Herr Dren­ger in den näch­sten Tagen vie­le mails zu beant­wor­ten haben .... ob das sein mail-Ser­ver aushält?

*2.edit*
Bei fefe ist fol­gen­des dazu zu lesen:
" .. Die Sei­te wird laut Impres­sum übri­gens von einem Inter­net-Por­no­ver­trieb betrie­ben, .. einer der größ­ten Por­no­an­bie­ter im deutsch­spra­chi­gen Inter­net. .. " - das wäre dann ein wei­te­res Bei­spiel für: "Den Bock zum Gärt­ner machen" - ob das all die besorg­ten Eltern wis­sen, wen sie da mit dem Schutz ihrer Kin­der betrauen?

*3.edit*
Auch das "Sci­ence Blog" und diver­se dort ver­tre­te­ne FACH-Blogs (!) sind 'zen­siert' weil für Jugend­li­che & Kin­der 'unge­eig­net' .... wahr­schein­lich weil sie vom Bibellesen abhal­ten und die Evo­lu­ti­on à la Dar­win vertreten ....

*4.edit*
Eine Zusam­men­fas­sung der "Sper­ror­gie" ist bei "mein gott und mei­ne welt" zu fin­den - ich emp­feh­le beson­ders die klei­nen Ani­ma­tio­nen mit Zah­len und Buchstaben!

bookmark_borderDie 13 Folter-Verantwortlichen
der Administration Bush

Veröffentlicht am von wvs

[Bear­bei­te­tes Zitat / Quel­le; sie­he hier­zu auch ]

The Tor­tu­re 13 exploi­ted the fede­ral bureau­cra­cy to estab­lish a tor­tu­re régime in two ways. First, they based the enhan­ced inter­ro­ga­ti­on tech­ni­ques on tech­ni­ques used in the U.S. military's Sur­vi­val, Eva­si­on, Resi­stance and Escape (SERE) pro­gram. The pro­gram -- which sub­jects vol­un­teers from the armed ser­vices to simu­la­ted hosti­le cap­tu­re situa­tions -- trains ser­vice­men and -women to with­stand coer­ci­on well enough to avo­id making fal­se con­fes­si­ons if cap­tu­red. Two reti­red SERE psy­cho­lo­gists con­trac­ted with the govern­ment to "rever­se-engi­neer" the­se tech­ni­ques to use in detai­nee inter­ro­ga­ti­ons. The Tor­tu­re 13 also abu­sed the legal review pro­cess in the Depart­ment of Justi­ce in order to pro­vi­de per­mis­si­on for tor­tu­re. The DOJ's Office of Legal Coun­sel (OLC) play­ed a cru­cial role. OLC pro­vi­des inter­pre­ta­ti­ons on how laws app­ly to the exe­cu­ti­ve branch. On issues whe­re the law is unclear, like natio­nal secu­ri­ty, OLC opi­ni­ons can set the boun­da­ry for "legal" acti­vi­ty for exe­cu­ti­ve branch employees. As Jack Golds­mith, OLC head from 2003 to 2004, explains it, "One con­se­quence of [OLC's] power to inter­pret the law is the power to bestow on govern­ment offi­ci­als what is effec­tively an advan­ce par­don for actions taken at the edges of vague cri­mi­nal sta­tu­tes." OLC has the power, Golds­mith con­ti­nues, to dis­pen­se "get-out-of-jail-free cards." The Tor­tu­re 13 exploi­ted this power by col­la­bo­ra­ting on a series of OLC opi­ni­ons that repea­ted­ly gave U.S. offi­ci­als such a "get-out-of-jail-free card" for tor­tu­ring. Bet­ween 9⁄11 and the end of 2002, the Tor­tu­re 13 deci­ded to tor­tu­re, then rever­se-engi­nee­red the tech­ni­ques, and then craf­ted the legal cover. Here's who they are and what they did:

 

 1.
Dick Che­ney, vice pre­si­dent (2001−2009)
  On the mor­ning of 9⁄11, .. Dick Che­ney (and) David Adding­ton, .. work­ed tog­e­ther to plot an expan­si­ve grab of exe­cu­ti­ve power that they clai­med was the cor­rect respon­se to the ter­ro­rist thre­at .. (they) also fought bureau­cra­ti­cal­ly to cons­truct this tor­tu­re pro­gram. Che­ney led the way by con­trol­ling who got access to Pre­si­dent Bush -- and making sure his own views pre­empt­ed others .. Most shockin­gly, Che­ney is repor­ted to have orde­red tor­tu­re hims­elf, even after inter­ro­ga­tors belie­ved detai­nees were coöpe­ra­ti­ve. Sin­ce the 2002 OLC memo known as "Bybee Two" that aut­ho­ri­zes tor­tu­re pre­mi­ses its aut­ho­rizati­on for tor­tu­re on the asser­ti­on that "the inter­ro­ga­ti­on team is cer­tain that" the detai­nee "has addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on he refu­ses to divul­ge," Che­ney appears to have orde­red tor­tu­re that was ille­gal even under the spu­rious gui­de­lines of the memo.
   2.
David Adding­ton, coun­sel to the vice pre­si­dent (2001−2005), chief of staff to the vice pre­si­dent (2005−2009)
  David Adding­ton cham­pio­ned the fight to argue that the pre­si­dent -- in his role as com­man­der in chief -- could not be bound by any law, inclu­ding tho­se pro­hi­bi­ting tor­tu­re. .. In par­ti­cu­lar, he ran a "War Coun­cil" with Jim Hay­nes, John Yoo, John Riz­zo and Alber­to Gon­za­les .. which craf­ted and exe­cu­ted many of the legal approa­ches to the war on ter­ror tog­e­ther .. Adding­ton and Che­ney wiel­ded bureau­cra­tic car­rots and sticks -- nota­b­ly by giving .. pro­mo­ti­ons for lawy­ers who sup­port­ed the­se ille­gal poli­ci­es. When Jack Golds­mith with­drew a num­ber of OLC memos becau­se of the legal pro­blems in them, Adding­ton was the sole admi­ni­stra­ti­on lawy­er who defen­ded them. 
 3.
Alber­to Gon­za­les, White Hou­se coun­sel (2001−2005), and att­or­ney gene­ral (2005−2008)
  As White Hou­se coun­sel, Alber­to Gon­za­les was nomi­nal­ly in char­ge of repre­sen­ting the president's views on legal issues, inclu­ding natio­nal secu­ri­ty issues. In that role, Gon­za­les wro­te and review­ed a num­ber of the legal opi­ni­ons that attempt­ed to immu­ni­ze tor­tu­re .. in a Jan. 25, 2002, opi­ni­on .. Gon­za­les paved the way for exemp­ting al-Qai­da detai­nees from the Gen­e­va Con­ven­ti­ons. His memo clai­med the "new kind of war" repre­sen­ted by the war against al-Qai­da "ren­ders obso­le­te Geneva's strict limi­ta­ti­ons on que­stio­ning of ene­my prisoners."
   4.
James Mit­chell, con­sul­tant
   .. James Mit­chell, a reti­red mili­ta­ry psy­cho­lo­gist, had been a lea­ding expert in the military's SERE pro­gram. In Decem­ber 2001, with his part­ner, Bruce Jes­sen, Mit­chell rever­se-engi­nee­red SERE tech­ni­ques to be used to inter­ro­ga­te detai­nees. Then, in the spring of 2002, befo­re OLC gave offi­ci­al legal appr­oval to tor­tu­re, Mit­chell over­saw Abu Zubaydah's inter­ro­ga­ti­on. An FBI agent on the sce­ne descri­bes Mit­chell over­see­ing the use of "bor­der­line tor­tu­re." .. Under Mitchell's gui­dance, inter­ro­ga­tors used the water­board with "far grea­ter fre­quen­cy than initi­al­ly indi­ca­ted" -- a total of 183 times in a month for Kha­lid Sheikh Moham­med and 83 times in a month for Abu Zubaydah.
   5.
Geor­ge Tenet, direc­tor of Cen­tral Intel­li­gence (1997−2004)
   .. Published reports say Tenet appro­ved every detail of the inter­ro­ga­ti­on plans: "Any chan­ge in the plan -- even if an extra day of a cer­tain tre­at­ment was added -- was signed off on by the Direc­tor." .. After appr­oval of the harsh tech­ni­ques, CIA head­quar­ters orde­red Abu Zubay­dah to be water­board­ed even though onsite inter­ro­ga­tors belie­ved Zubay­dah was "com­pli­ant." .. this addi­tio­nal use of the water­board was cle­ar­ly ille­gal accor­ding to the memo.
   6.
Con­do­leez­za Rice, natio­nal secu­ri­ty advi­sor (2001−2005), secre­ta­ry of sta­te (2005−2008)
   .. Rice coör­di­na­ted much of the administration's inter­nal deba­te over inter­ro­ga­ti­on poli­ci­es. She appro­ved (she now says she "con­vey­ed the aut­ho­rizati­on") for the first known offi­ci­al­ly sanc­tion­ed use of tor­tu­re .. The appr­oval from the OLC was given oral­ly in late July and in writ­ten form on Aug. 1, 2002. Rice's appr­oval or "convey[ance] of aut­ho­rizati­on" led direct­ly to the inten­si­fi­ed torture ..
   7.
John Yoo, depu­ty assi­stant att­or­ney gene­ral, OLC / Office of Legal Coun­sel (2001−2003)
  As depu­ty assi­stant att­or­ney gene­ral of OLC focu­sing on natio­nal secu­ri­ty for the first year and a half after 9⁄11, Yoo draf­ted many of the memos that would estab­lish the tor­tu­re régime, start­ing with the opi­ni­on clai­ming vir­tual­ly unli­mi­t­ed power for the pre­si­dent in times of war. In the ear­ly months of 2002, he .. (draf­ted) two key memos aut­ho­ri­zing torture:
- Bybee One (pro­vi­ding legal cover for tor­tu­re) and 
- Bybee Two (describ­ing the tech­ni­ques that could be used), both dated Aug. 1, 2002.
- The .. memos argue that "neces­si­ty" or "self-defen­se" might be used as defen­ses against pro­se­cu­ti­on, even though the United Nati­ons Con­ven­ti­on Against Tor­tu­re expli­ci­t­ly sta­tes that "no excep­tio­nal cir­cum­stances whatsoe­ver, whe­ther a sta­te of war or a thre­at or war ... may be invo­ked as a justi­fi­ca­ti­on of tor­tu­re." .. the tech­ni­ques the CIA could use in inter­ro­ga­ti­on, was pre­mi­sed on hot­ly deba­ted assump­ti­ons. For exam­p­le, the .. memo clai­med Zubay­dah was men­tal­ly and phy­si­cal­ly fit to be water­board­ed, even though Zubay­dah had had head and recent gunshot inju­ries. .. In all of his tor­tu­re memos, Yoo igno­red key pre­ce­dents rela­ting .. to sepa­ra­ti­on of powers. . 
 8.
Jay Bybee, assi­stant att­or­ney gene­ral, Office of Legal Coun­sel (2001−2003)
  As head of the OLC when the first tor­tu­re memos were appro­ved, Bybee signed the memos named after him that John Yoo draf­ted. At the time, the White Hou­se knew that Bybee wan­ted an appoint­ment as a Cir­cuit Court judge; after sig­ning his name to memos sup­port­ing tor­tu­re, he recei­ved such an appoint­ment. Of par­ti­cu­lar con­cern is the timing of Bybee's appr­oval of the tor­tu­re tech­ni­ques. He first appro­ved some tech­ni­ques on July 24, 2002. The next day, Jim Hay­nes, the Defen­se Department's gene­ral coun­sel, orde­red the SERE unit of DOD to coll­ect infor­ma­ti­on inclu­ding details on water­boar­ding. While the record is con­tra­dic­to­ry on whe­ther Hay­nes or CIA Gene­ral Coun­sel John Riz­zo gave that infor­ma­ti­on to OLC, on the day they did so, OLC appro­ved water­boar­ding. One of the docu­ments in that packet iden­ti­fi­ed the­se actions as tor­tu­re, and sta­ted that tor­tu­re often pro­du­ced unre­lia­ble results
  9.
Wil­liam "Jim" Hay­nes, Defen­se Depart­ment gene­ral coun­sel (2001−2008)
  As gene­ral coun­sel of the Defen­se Depart­ment, Jim Hay­nes over­saw the legal ana­ly­sis of inter­ro­ga­ti­on tech­ni­ques to be used with mili­ta­ry detai­nees .. Hay­nes play­ed a key role in making sure some of the tech­ni­ques were adopted, with litt­le review, by the mili­ta­ry. He was thus cru­cial to the migra­ti­on of tor­tu­re to Guan­tá­na­mo and then Iraq. In Sep­tem­ber 2002, Hay­nes par­ti­ci­pa­ted in a key visit to Guan­tá­na­mo .. Hay­nes igno­red repea­ted war­nings from within the armed ser­vices about the tech­ni­ques, inclu­ding state­ments that the tech­ni­ques "may vio­la­te tor­tu­re sta­tu­te" and "cross the line of 'huma­ne' tre­at­ment." In Octo­ber 2002, when the legal coun­sel for the military's Joint Chiefs of Staff attempt­ed to con­duct a tho­rough legal review of the tech­ni­ques, Hay­nes orde­red her to stop, becau­se "peo­p­le were going to see" the objec­tions that some in the mili­ta­ry had rai­sed. On Nov. 27, 2002, Hay­nes recom­men­ded that Secre­ta­ry of Defen­se Donald Rums­feld aut­ho­ri­ze many of the reque­sted tech­ni­ques, inclu­ding stress posi­ti­ons, hoo­ding, the rem­oval of clot­hing, and the use of dogs -- the same tech­ni­ques that show­ed up later in the abu­se at Abu Ghraib.
 10.
Donald Rums­feld, secre­ta­ry of defen­se (2001−2006)
  As secre­ta­ry of defen­se, Rums­feld signed off on inter­ro­ga­ti­on methods used in the mili­ta­ry, nota­b­ly for Abu Ghraib, Bagram Air Force Base and Guan­tá­na­mo Bay. With this appr­oval, the use of tor­tu­re would move from the CIA to the mili­ta­ry. A recent bipar­ti­san Sena­te report con­clu­ded that "Secre­ta­ry of Defen­se Donald Rumsfeld's aut­ho­rizati­on of inter­ro­ga­ti­on tech­ni­ques at Guan­tá­na­mo Bay was a direct cau­se of detai­nee abu­se the­re." Rums­feld per­so­nal­ly appro­ved tech­ni­ques inclu­ding the use of pho­bi­as (dogs), forced nudi­ty and stress posi­ti­ons on Dec. 2, 2002, sig­ning a one-page memo pre­pared for him by Hay­nes. The­se tech­ni­ques were among tho­se dee­med tor­tu­re in the Charles Gra­ner case and .. the plan used many of the same tech­ni­ques .. inclu­ding sen­so­ry depri­va­ti­on and "sleep adjust­ment." And through it all, Rums­feld main­tai­ned a dis­da­in­ful view on the­se tech­ni­ques, at one point quip­ping on a memo appro­ving harsh tech­ni­ques, "I stand for eight to 10 hours a day. Why is stan­ding limi­t­ed to four hours?"
 11.
John Riz­zo, CIA depu­ty gene­ral coun­sel (2002−2004), acting gene­ral coun­sel of the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agen­cy (2001−2002, 2004-present)
  As depu­ty gene­ral coun­sel and then acting gene­ral coun­sel for the CIA, John Rizzo's name appears on all of the known OLC opi­ni­ons on tor­tu­re for the CIA .. Riz­zo pro­vi­ded a descrip­ti­on of water­boar­ding using one stan­dard, while the OLC opi­ni­on descri­bed a more mode­ra­te stan­dard. Signi­fi­cant­ly, the descrip­ti­on of water­boar­ding sub­mit­ted to OLC came from the Defen­se Depart­ment .. Riz­zo also pro­vi­ded a docu­ment that cal­led enhan­ced methods "tor­tu­re" and dee­med them unre­lia­ble -- yet even with this war­ning, Riz­zo still advo­ca­ted for the CIA to get per­mis­si­on to use tho­se techniques. 
 12.
Ste­ven Brad­bu­ry, prin­ci­pal depu­ty assi­stant att­or­ney gene­ral, OLC (2004), acting assi­stant att­or­ney gene­ral, OLC (2005−2009)
  In 2004, the CIA's inspec­tor gene­ral wro­te a report con­clu­ding that the CIA's inter­ro­ga­ti­on pro­gram might vio­la­te the Con­ven­ti­on Against Tor­tu­re. It fell to Acting Assi­stant Att­or­ney Gene­ral Ste­ven Brad­bu­ry to wri­te three memos in May 2005 that would dis­miss the con­cerns the IG Report rai­sed -- in effect, to affirm the OLC's 2002 memos legi­ti­mi­zing tor­tu­re. Bradbury's memos noted the ways in which pri­or tor­tu­re had exce­e­ded the Bybee Two memo: the 183 uses of the water­board for Kha­lid Sheikh Moham­med in one month, the gal­lon and a half used in water­boar­ding, the 20 to 30 times a detai­nee is thrown agains the wall, the 11 days a detai­nee had been made to stay awa­ke, the extra ses­si­ons of water­boar­ding orde­red from CIA head­quar­ters even after local inter­ro­ga­tors dee­med Abu Zubay­dah to be ful­ly com­pli­ant. Yet Brad­bu­ry does not con­sider it tor­tu­re. He notes the CIA's doc­tors' cau­ti­ons about the com­bi­na­ti­on of using the water­board with a phy­si­cal­ly fatigued detai­nee, yet in a sepa­ra­te memo appro­ves the use of sleep depri­va­ti­on and water­boa­ding in tan­dem. He repea­ted­ly con­ce­des that the CIA's inter­ro­ga­ti­on tech­ni­ques as actual­ly imple­men­ted exce­e­ded the SERE tech­ni­ques, yet repea­ted­ly points to the con­nec­tion to SERE to argue the methods must be legal. 
 13.
Geor­ge W. Bush, pre­si­dent (2001−2009)
  While Pre­si­dent Bush main­tai­ned some distance from the tor­tu­re for years -- Che­ney descri­bes him "basi­cal­ly" aut­ho­ri­zing it -- he ser­ved as the chief pro­pa­gan­dist about its effi­ca­cy and neces­si­ty. Most nota­b­ly, on Sept. 6, 2006, when Bush first con­fes­sed to the pro­gram, Bush repea­ted the claims made to sup­port the Bybee Two memo: that Abu Zubay­dah wouldn't talk except by using tor­tu­re. And in 2006, after the CIA's own inspec­tor gene­ral had rai­sed pro­blems with the pro­gram, after Ste­ven Brad­bu­ry had admit­ted all the ways that the tor­tu­re pro­gram exce­e­ded gui­de­lines, Bush still clai­med it was legal. "[They] were desi­gned to be safe, to com­ply with our laws, our Con­sti­tu­ti­on and our trea­ty obli­ga­ti­ons. The Depart­ment of Justi­ce review­ed the aut­ho­ri­zed methods exten­si­ve­ly, and deter­mi­ned them to be lawful." With this state­ment, the decep­ti­ons and bureau­cra­tic games all came full cir­cle. After all, it was Bush who, on Feb. 7, 2002, had declared the Gen­e­va Con­ven­ti­ons wouldn't app­ly (a view the Supre­me Court ulti­m­ate­ly rejec­ted). Bush's inac­tion in tor­tu­re is as important as his actions .. (he) fai­led to ful­fill legal obli­ga­ti­ons to noti­fy Con­gress of the tor­tu­re pro­gram. A Sena­te Intel­li­gence time­line on the tor­tu­re pro­gram makes clear that Con­gress was not briefed on the tech­ni­ques used in the tor­tu­re pro­gram .. then Hou­se Intel­li­gence ran­king mem­ber Jane Har­man shows that she had not yet seen evi­dence that Bush had signed off on this poli­cy. This sug­gests Pre­si­dent Bush did not pro­vi­de the legal­ly requi­red noti­ce to Con­gress, vio­la­ting Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty Decis­i­ons Direc­ti­ve-286. What Bush did not say is as legal­ly important as what he did say.

 
Yet, ulti­m­ate­ly, Bush and wha­te­ver appr­oval he gave the pro­gram is at the cen­ter of the administration's embrace of tor­tu­re. Con­do­leez­za Rice recent­ly said, "By defi­ni­ti­on, if it was aut­ho­ri­zed by the pre­si­dent, it did not vio­la­te our obli­ga­ti­ons in the Con­ven­ti­on Against Tor­tu­re." While Rice has tried to reframe her state­ment, it uses the same logic used by John Yoo and David Adding­ton to justi­fy the pro­gram, the shocking cla­im that inter­na­tio­nal and dome­stic laws can­not bind the pre­si­dent in times of war.

 
Bush's clo­se allies still insist if he aut­ho­ri­zed it, it couldn't be torture. 

 

bookmark_borderDie - angeblichen - Verfassungsfeinde ....

Veröffentlicht am von wvs

stel­len sich als die ein­zi­gen her­aus, die noch nicht ein­mal(!) einem ver­fas­sungs­wid­ri­gen Gesetz zuge­stimmt haben
- die am lau­te­sten schreien:
SPD vor­an & CDU gleich hinterher
- sind die­je­ni­gen, die den größ­ten Mist ver­zapft haben ....

Und es wahr­schein­lich, nein, sicher­lich, wie­der tun werden! 

Des­we­gen:
Kei­ne Stim­me für Par­tei­en die das Grund­ge­setz aus­zu­höh­len trachten ....